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Near Optimal Adversarial Aack on UCB Bandits
SHILIANG ZUO, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
We consider a stochastic multi-arm bandit problem where rewards are subject to adversarial corruption. We
propose a novel attack strategy that manipulates a UCB principle into pulling some non-optimal target arm
T − o(T ) times with a cumulative cost that scales as √logT , where T is the number of rounds. We also prove
the first lower bound on the cumulative attack cost. Our lower boundmatches our upper bound up to log logT
factors, showing our attack to be near optimal.
1 INTRODUCTION
Stochastic multi-arm bandit (MAB) is a framework for online learning with limited feedback, and
in recent years, it has seen a wide range of applications including recommendation systems, adver-
tisement placement, and medical trial experiments. Though extensive research studied different
algorithms on optimizing the regret in the MAB, little is known about the robustness of these
algorithms.
In this paper, we study adversarial attacks against MAB algorithms. In the traditional MAB
setting, a principle interacts with the environment and learns from the limited feedback. In our
setting, we consider an adversary who sits between the principle and the environment. In standard
MAB problems, the environment consists of K arms, each giving sub-gaussian rewards with mean
µ1, ...,K . At each round, the principle chooses an arm and observes the random reward generated
by this arm. In our adversarial setting, the adversary observes the chosen arm and random reward,
and has the ability to add a perturbation to the reward. Then the principle is only able to observe
the corrupted reward. Informally, the adversary wishes to manipulate the principle into choosing
any non-target arms a sublinear number of times, while minimizing the cumulative attack cost,
which is defined as the sum of perturbations throughout all rounds.
In this paper, we specifically target the UCB algorithm. When the target arm is K , we give a
Oˆ(Kσ
√
logT +
∑
i,K ∆
+
i
) attack which holds forT uniformly over time, where K is the number of
arms, σ 2 is the variance of the reward distributions, and ∆+
i
= max(0, µi − µK ). The attack forces
the principle to pull the target arm T − o(T ) times, and succeeds with high probability. We also
establish the first lower bound on the cumulative attack cost, in turn showing our attack to be near
optimal.
1.1 Related Work
Our adversary model follows closely with [2]. In their work, the authors showed an attack strategy
against the UCB algorithm with the cumulative attack cost scaling asO(logT ). Liu and Sheroff [3]
further proposed an attack strategy against any algorithm without knowledge of the specific al-
gorithm the principle is running. These results are mostly pessimistic, showing classical bandit
algorithms are prone to attack: indeed, only a logarithmic attack cost is needed to corrupt the
entire system.
Another line of work takes the viewpoint of the principle and focus on designing algorithm ro-
bust to adversarial corruptions [1, 4, 5]. In this line of work, the principle adapts some randomized
algorithm aiming at achieving low regret in the presence of adversarial attacks. This is comple-
mentary to our result showing the vunerability of bandit algorithms.
2 PREMILINARIES
We consider a stochastic multi-arm bandits setting, where rewards are subject to an adversarial
corruption. An adversary has the power of perturbing rewards at every round, with the goal of
2019
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tricking the principle into pulling some target armT −o(T ) times, while minimizing cumulative at-
tack cost. We assume the target arm is armK . The attack framework is summarized in algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Bandit under attacks
for t = 1, 2, ... do
Principle picks arm It according to arm selection rule (in this case UCB);
Adversary learns It and pre-attack reward r
0
t
, chooses attack α , suffers attack cost |α |;
Principle receives reward rt = r
0
t
− α ;
Reward distribution for arm i is subgaussian with variance proxy σ 2 and mean µi . We assume
the principle is running UCB algorithm. In the first K rounds, the principle pulls each arm once to
obtain an initial estimate. Then in later rounds T , the UCB index for arm i is
µˆi (t − 1) + 3σ
√
logT
Ni (t − 1)
where µˆ is the empirical mean. The arm with the largest index is pulled.
2.1 Intuition
IfT known ahead of time, there is a very simple attack. If the principle were using UCB, each arm
is pulled once to obtain an estimate of the mean in the first K rounds. For convenience assume
arm K is picked in the very first round. In the later K − 1 rounds, add perturbations so that µˆi <
µˆK − cσ − 3σ
√
logT , where c is some parameter (can be treated as constant). Non-target arms will
never be picked again with high probability, and attack succeeds with attack costO(3Kσ
√
logT ).
What ifT is unknown? Let’s suppose some non-target arm i is pulled c = o(T ) times in the first
T rounds. The UCB index of arm i is then:
µˆi + 3σ
√
logT
c
If the adversary wishes to manipulate the principle into pulling the target arm almost always, we
need to set the UCB index of arm i lower than that of arm K . Thus
µˆi + 3σ
√
logT
c
< µˆK
Since the confidence interval of arm K can be approximated to be 0.
Then, the attack cost can be estimated to be roughly
(∆i + 3σ
√
logT
c
)c
This shows we want to pull non-target arms as few times as possible. This also suggests a
Ω(
√
logT ) attack lower bound.
3 OPTIMAL ATTACK
We show an attack strategy which works forT uniformly over time. Ni (t) denotes the number of
times arm i was pulled in the first t rounds. For convenience assume arm K is picked in the first
round. µˆi will represent post-attack empirical mean, µˆ
0
i
will represent pre-attack empirical mean.
∆i = µi − µK , ∆+i = max(0,∆i ).
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Algorithm 2: Attack on UCB
β(n) =
√
2σ 2
n
log pi
2Kn2
3δ ;
θ = 1.1;
for t = 1, 2, ... do
if It , K then
n = Ni (t);
Attack with smallest |α |, such that µˆi ≤ µˆK − 2β(NK (t)) − 3σθn
Let
β(n) =
√
2σ 2
n
log
π 2Kn2
3δ
.
Define event E as
∀i, t , |µˆ0
i
(t) − µi | < β(Ni (t))
We can show with high probability, the pre-attack empirical means is concentrated around the
true mean within an error of β(n). This has been shown in [2] as the following.
Lemma 3.1. Event E happens with probability 1 − δ . Further, the sequence β is non-increasing.
Using our attack strategy, we can show any non-target arm is pulled O(log logT ) times before
any round T :
Lemma 3.2. Assume event E. At any round t , any non-target arm is pulled at most ⌈log
θ
√
log t⌉
times.
Proof. For sake of contradiction suppose some non-target arm is pulledmore than ⌈log
θ
√
log t⌉
times. After this arm is pulled for the ⌈log
θ
√
log t⌉-th time at round t0 < t , we must have
µˆ0
i
(t0) < µˆK (t0) − 2β(NK (t0)) − 3σθ logθ
√
log t
= µˆK (t0) − 2β(NK (t0)) − 3σ
√
log t .
Consider any round t1 : t0 < t1 < t . The UCB index for arm i is
µˆ0
i
(t1) + 3σ
√
log t1
Ni (t1)
= µˆ0
i
(t0) + 3σ
√
log t1
Ni (t0)
≤ µˆK (t0) − 3σ
√
log t − 2β(NK (t0)) + 3σ
√
log t1
Ni (t0)
≤ µˆK (t1) − 3σ
√
log t + 3σ
√
log t1
Ni (t0)
≤ µˆK (t1)

Theorem 3.3. With probability 1 − δ , for any T , any non-target arm is pulled O(log logT ) times
and total attack cost is Oˆ(Kσ
√
logT + ∆+
i
).
Proof. For any t ,
µˆi (t) =
µˆ0
i
(t)Ni (t) −
∑
s ∈τi (t ) αs
Ni (t)
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Thus in round t if we were attacking arm i , then
µˆ0
i
(t)Ni (t) −
∑
s ∈τi (t ) αs
Ni (t)
= µˆi (t)
= µˆK (t) − 2β(NK (t)) − 3σθNi (t )
Consequently
1
Ni (t)
∑
s ∈τi (s)
αt = µˆ
0
i
(t) − µˆK (t) + 2β(NK (t)) + 3σθNi (t )
≤ ∆+
i
+ β(Ni (t)) + 3β(NK (t)) + 3σθNi (t )
≤ ∆+
i
+ β(Ni (t)) + 3β(NK (t)) + 3σθ logθ
√
log t+1
≤ ∆+i + 4β(Ni (t)) + 3θσ
√
log t
Thus for arm i ∑
s ∈τi (t )
αs ≤ Ni (t)(∆+i + 4β(Ni (t)) + 3θσ
√
log t )
= Oˆ(σ
√
log t + ∆+i )
Summing over all non-target arms, and the total attack cost is Oˆ(Kσ
√
log t +
∑
i,K ∆
+
i
).

4 LOWER BOUNDS
In this section we prove lower bounds on the cumulative cost for the attack to succeed against
different algorithms. We remark that our lower bound are rather loose, but already match our
upper bound up to constant and log logT factors.
4.1 Aack on UCB
Argument for Ω(
√
logT ) lower bound for UCB attack cost is presented in previous section 2.1, we
formalize it below.
Theorem 4.1. Consider two arms giving subgaussian rewards, with mean µ1 > µ2 and variance-
proxy σ 2. Given δ < 0.5, for any T > 10/δ , with probability 1 − δ , an attack cost of Ω(∆ + σ
√
logT )
is needed to manipulate the principle into pulling the 1st arm no more than N times, when N < T/C ,
where C is some universal constant.
Proof. Consider the last time the target arm is pulled. Denote this (random) time by t , and
suppose arm 1 has been pulled Nt times up til round t . Suppose the attacker spent a total cost α1
attacking arm 1, and α2 attacking arm 2. At round t , we must have
µˆ2 + 3σ
√
log t
t − Nt − 1
> µˆ1 + 3σ
√
log t
Nt
Therefore forC large enough, with probability 1 − δ ,
µ2 +
α2
t − Nt − 1
+ β(t − Nt − 1) + 3σ
√
log t
t − Nt − 1
> µ1 −
α1
Nt
− β(Nt ) + 3σ
√
log t
Nt
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=⇒ α1 + α2
Nt
> ∆ − β(Nt ) − β(t − Nt − 1) + 3σ
√
log t
Nt
− 3σ
√
log t
t − Nt − 1
≥ ∆ − 1.01β(Nt ) + 2.99σ
√
log t
Nt
≥ ∆ + 0.5σ
√
log t
Nt
and
α ≥ Nt∆ + 0.5σ
√
Nt log 0.99T ≥ ∆ + 0.5σ
√
log 0.99T

The lower bound generalizes when there are more than 2 arms, with more cumbersome nota-
tions. This shows our attack to be optimal up to log log t factors.
4.2 Aack on ϵ-greedy
For comparision, we establish a lower bound on the cumulative attack cost against ϵ-greedy. Our
lower bound shows the attack proposed in [2] is essentially optimal.
Theorem 4.2. Consider the same environment as in previous theorem. Given δ < 0.5, there exists
constantC,C ′, such that whenT > C , with probability 1−δ , an attack cost of Ω(∆ logT ) is needed to
manipulate an ϵ-greedy principle with rate ϵt = cK/t into pulling the 1st arm no more than N times,
when N < T/C ′.
We will give a sketch of the proof. Consider the last exploitation round before T in which the
principle pulled the 2nd arm, denote by t . By roundT , with high probability, the number of times
the 2nd arm was pulled in exploration round is Θ(logT ), thus to ensure the 2nd arm is pulled no
less than T −T/C rounds, we must have
t > T −T/C − Θ(logT )
In this round, the post-attack mean of the 2nd arm must be higher than that of the 1st arm:
µˆ2(t) > µˆ1(t)
With high probability the pre-attack means concentrates around true mean, therefore,
µ2 + β(t − N1 − 1) + α2
t − N1 − 1
> µ1 − β(N1) − α1
N1
α1
N1
> ∆ − 2β(N1)
α1 > N1∆ − 2N1β(N1)
Note that with high probability again, N1 = Ω(logT ). For T large enough, the first term will
dominate the second term, and our lower bound is proven.
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a novel attack strategy against the UCB algorithm, and established
the first lower bound on cumulative attack cost. Our lower bound matches our attack cost up to
log logT factors, showing our attack to be near optimal. Our results indicate serious threats as the
UCB algorithm can be easily compromised.We acknowledge that our current result is very limited,
as the attack strategy only applies to this specific algorithm. Nonetheless, our results indicate that
the UCB algorithm, arguably the most popular algorithm in multi-arm bandits, is perhaps the most
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easily exploitable algorithm when compared to other algorithms which are randomized, such as
the ϵ-greedy algorithm.
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